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Language Loss and Illocutionary Silencing
Ethan Nowak
Umea˚ University
ethan.nowak@umu.se
The twenty-first century will witness an unprecedented decline in the diversity of
the world’s languages. While most philosophers will likely agree that this decline is
lamentable, the question of what exactly is lost with a language has not been
systematically explored in the philosophical literature. In this paper, I address
this lacuna by arguing that language loss constitutes a problematic form of illo-
cutionary silencing. When a language disappears, past and present speakers lose the
ability to realize a range of speech acts that can only be realized in that language.
With that ability, speakers lose something in which they have a fundamental inter-
est: their standing as fully empowered members of a linguistic community.
1. Introduction
Roughly seven thousand languages are currently spoken on our planet.
By the end of the century, nearly half will have disappeared, victims of
migration, urbanization, and other cultural and economic changes.
Most philosophers will likely agree that, with each language that
vanishes, something significant will be lost. The question of what
exactly that something is, however, is not one that has received the
attention it deserves in the philosophical literature.1
In the popular press, the topic of language extinction is often intro-
duced in connection with an appeal to the utility that each language
might offer linguists as a data point.2 Sometimes an analogy is drawn
with the risk that a loss of diversity of biological species will cause us
to miss out on potential drug discovery targets or other useful or
1 To the extent that the question of language loss has been taken up by philosophers, it has
typically been in connection with questions about the political rights of minority groups; see,
for example, Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995, 2001), Van Parijs (2000), Patten (2001, 2005, 2009,
2019), and the contributions in Kymlicka and Patten (2003). While this is indisputably an
important literature, the kinds of considerations that have been advanced in support of claims
about minority rights and linguistic justice do not, as far as I can tell, really speak much to
what is distinctive about language extinction.
2 See, for example, Woodbury (n.d.) and Nuwer (2014). Indeed, this is an argument that
appears in some scholarly work on the subject too; see Crystal (2000).
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interesting substances. Although there are surely insights to be gained
from studying a diverse range of languages, this kind of instrumental
justification falls short in a number of ways. First of all, it is not
obvious that the efforts of researchers to give an account of the
basic mechanisms whereby linguistic strings are generated and pro-
cessed will in fact depend on the specific details of any particular
language. More fundamentally, by casting the value of a language in
instrumental terms, the ‘needs of science’ response misses a strong
intuition: other things being equal, it seems clear that something sig-
nificant would be lost when an endangered language disappears, even
if we knew beforehand that no feature of that language would unlock
the secret to language in general.
Anthropologists and sociologists frequently offer arguments that
track something more obviously worth attending to.3 One of these
arguments involves pointing out that language loss is frequently the
result of various forms of political and economic injustice and op-
pression. According to a related argument, language loss tends to co-
occur with the assimilation of one culture by another—or worse, its
total obliteration. Hence, in so far as we are worried about injustice
and a diminishing diversity of cultures, we should worry about the loss
of languages.4
It is not hard to imagine how these sorts of considerations might
provide us with reasons to be troubled by the precarious state of many
of the world’s languages. Nevertheless, as in the case of the ‘value to
science’ response, the instrumental nature of these reasons passes over
something that seems obvious: even if we could somehow guarantee
equality and preserve a minority culture, there would still be much to
lament if the language of the people involved were lost.5
My aim here will be to sketch a novel approach to the question of
why we should be troubled by the progressive diminishing of the
3 For just a few examples drawn from a vast literature, see Day (1985), Sankoff (2002), and
King and Haboud (2011).
4 Blake (2003) provides a philosophical argument for liberal language policies that takes
this kind of injustice to be the key consideration involved in cases of language loss.
5 I can imagine someone objecting that my formulation separates things that should not or
cannot really be separated. Maybe a language is an inalienable component of a culture; if so,
then valuing the diversity of cultures might require valuing the diversity of languages. Anyone
tempted by that line is invited to read the present argument as aiming to throw light on what
exactly it is that makes a language culturally significant. On the line I will press here, the links
between our cultural knowledge and our linguistic competence turn out to be both broader
and deeper than philosophers typically acknowledge.
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diversity of the world’s languages. I begin by introducing a view of
slurs and pejoratives that has been influential recently. On that view,
versions of which have been defended by Lepore and Stone (2018),
Nunberg (2018), and Dı´az-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton (2019), the dif-
ference between a slur and a neutral counterpart expression is not a
difference in meaning, but a difference in what Nunberg calls the
‘linguistic metadata’ associated with each expression.6 What make
slurs repulsive, according to this analysis, are problematic facts
about their previous use, like the fact that they are or were common
among people who held abhorrent prejudices, or who advocated or
perpetrated violence, injustice, or similar against the group targeted by
the slur. Competent speakers who encounter slurs know these histor-
ical facts, at least at a high level of generality, and that knowledge
allows them to recognize slurring speech for what it is.
Although I find this analysis of slurs attractive, I will not attempt to
defend it here against competing proposals. What is important for my
purposes is that the analysis suggests a way of thinking about language
that reveals a point of broad significance: there are some speech acts
whose identity depends crucially on fine-grained features of their par-
ticular mode of realization. By deploying data drawn from a wide
variety of colloquial and literary sources, I will argue that understand-
ing what someone is doing with her words often requires attending
not just to what she says, but to how she says it. Interpreting a poem,
for example, typically requires recognizing the overlapping layers of
significance marked by a word, structure or metre with particular
phonetic or prosodic properties or historical associations. If you
change the words, their sound or their structure, you end up with a
different poem.
It is a short step from here to the claim that there are certain speech
acts whose identity depends on specific features of the language used
to realize them. While a bilingual speaker might be able to express all
of the same contents in English (say) as she can in her heritage lan-
guage, I will argue that if no one else can speak that language, or if she
is cut off from the community of speakers, she is deprived of the
ability to activate the particular network of associations, historical
and otherwise, that gives that language a distinctive character, and
its speakers each a distinctive voice. Speech acts that depend on
those associations are undermined, and thus speakers are silenced,
6 Pullum (2018) bears mentioning in this connection as well, although due to a difference
in focus I will not discuss his work in detail here.
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both literally and in the philosophical sense explicated by Langton
(1993) and Hornsby (1995), as their heritage languages disappear.
In the final section of the paper, I turn my attention to the question
of why this kind of silencing is problematic, and I consider some
objections to the position I develop. I will claim that speakers of
threatened languages are harmed when their languages disappear, be-
cause (i) humans have a fundamental interest in being fully em-
powered members of a speech community, and (ii) the silencing
that occurs when languages are lost is silencing produced systematic-
ally and by unjust mechanisms; that is, it is silencing that people suffer
in virtue of being part of disempowered communities.7 I close by
acknowledging the worry that my proposal will overgenerate by en-
tailing that any change in a language involves the loss of something
valuable; I claim we can accept that all change does amount to the loss
of something of value without enabling a reductio, since we are capable
of discriminating between losses that are more and less significant.
2. Linguistic metadata and the identity of speech acts
2.1 The history of a word shapes what can be done with it
One of the central aims of the substantial philosophical literature on
slurs is to explain what makes them problematic. The question is
typically set up in terms of a distinction between slurring terms and
an alleged class of expressions called ‘neutral counterparts’.8 While a
slur and its counterpart are supposed to have the same extension (or
putative extension), trading one for the other changes the nature of
the speech act (or acts) that would (or could) be realized by means of
a certain sentence. Compare:
(1) (Neutral group designation) are F.
(a) North Americans are dumb.
(b) Germans are cruel.
7 Crucially, as I will show, the second point does not imply that the evil of silencing is just
the same as the evil of economic or social inequality. An anonymous referee points out that in
the silencing literature, it is typically held that illocutionary disablement ‘not only reflects but
constitutes’ an injustice; I will argue that this standard is met in the case of language loss.
8 An anonymous referee points out that it is not obvious that all (or even any) slurs really
have neutral counterpart expressions. Although I share the referee’s intuition, since the argu-
ment I will offer here does not require there to be such counterparts, I will not take a stand on
the question of whether there really are any. I follow the standard dialectical approach from
the literature when framing the issue simply for the sake of familiarity.
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(2) (Slur for the same group) are F.
(a) Gringos are dumb.
(b) Boches are cruel.
Sentences derived from template (1) express candidate truths; holding
thorny questions about the interpretation of generics aside, such sen-
tences will be true just in case members of the group in question tend
to be F.9 Attitudes differ as to whether or not sentences derived from
template (2) are candidates for expressing truths at all.10 People gen-
erally agree, however, that someone who utters a sentence derived
from (2) thereby disparages members of the group targeted by the
slur, and thus does something offensive or morally problematic.
Philosophers have sought to account for the difference between slurs
and their neutral counterparts in a wide variety of ways. If we limit our
attention to views on which sentences of both form (1) and (2) express
truth-evaluable contents, the standard approach is to claim that slurs
involve two distinct components of meaning. At one level, the slur and
its neutral counterpart pick out the same property, like the property of
belonging to a certain social group. What distinguishes the slur is that it
additionally involves a further meaningful element that encodes some-
thing problematic.11 To mention just a few of the prominent alternatives
here, some philosophers take this element to involve content, some think
it should be treated presuppositionally, and some think that the problem
is due to a conventional implicature.12
9 Sentences involving generic noun phrases are the focus of a substantial literature. ‘Dogs
have tails’ seems intuitively true, although not every dog has a tail. Many people will accept
‘Sharks are dangerous’, even though most sharks are not dangerous. A wide variety of semantic
and pragmatic proposals have been advanced to explain what threshold of Fs (or what kind of
prototypical Fs) must be G in order for sentences of the form ‘Fs are G’ to be true in a
context; for a representative sample, see Carlson (1995), Leslie (2007), Leslie and Gelman
(2012), Sterken (2015), and others.
10 For arguments against the idea that slurring statements are truth evaluable, see, for
example, Richard (2008), DiFranco (2015) for arguments against the idea that slurring state-
ments are truth evaluable.
11 In this regard, much of the contemporary discussion follows the broad contours of
Frege’s distinction between one component of the meaning of an expression that properly
contributes to the thoughts it can be used to express and another component which contrib-
utes a ‘tone’, ‘colour’ or ‘shading’ ( Frege 1918/1956).
12 Gibbard (2003), for example, holds that slurs are like the ‘thick’ ethical concepts
described by Williams (1985) in involving an attribution of group membership, together
with the expression of an evaluative attitude towards the group. Hom (2008) says that slurs
pick out a complex property constructed from prescriptions for treatment (for instance,
‘should be subject to higher standards in university admissions’) together with racist
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Anderson and Lepore (2013) offer a theory that breaks with the
standard picture by denying that the offensiveness of slurs is best
explained in terms of their meaning in the first place. For them, a
slur means exactly what its neutral counterpart does; it is simply a
designation for a group. On their view, the extension of ‘Boche’ is just
whatever the extension of ‘German’ is. What makes the slur problem-
atic, they claim, is the metalinguistic fact that there is a general social
prohibition on using it.
While many philosophers have pointed out problems for this
view, the idea that the problematic nature of slurs might be due,
not to facts about their meaning, but to background facts about
their pattern of use, has been at the heart of several prominent
recent contributions to the literature. Lepore and Stone (2018),
Nunberg (2018) and Dı´az-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton (2019) have
all defended versions of this idea. Compare the following passage
from Nunberg:
I’ll argue that redskin is distinguished from Indian not by any additional
evaluative or expressive features of its meaning, but merely in being the
description of Indians prescribed by the conventions of a group whose
members have disparaging attitudes about American Indians. Then the
implications of pointedly choosing to use redskin arise not from the
meaning of the word but from its association with the discourse of a
certain group of speakers.
In a nutshell: racists don’t use slurs because they ’re derogative; slurs are
derogative because they ’re the words that racists use. (Nunberg 2018,
p. 244)
In this passage, Nunberg distinguishes the implications of someone’s
choice to use the expression ‘redskin’ from the metalinguistic fact that
‘redskin’ is an expression used by racists. Where the nature of the
speech acts that can be realized using ‘redskin’ is concerned, however,
it is this latter fact that bears the explanatory weight. Regardless of a
speaker’s intentions on a particular occasion, or indeed of her famil-
iarity with the history of the expression, Nunberg’s view is that a
person who uses ‘redskin’ disparages Native Americans. Why?
ideological descriptions (for instance, ‘because they are so good at maths’) and attributions of
group membership couched in neutral terms (for instance, ‘because their ancestors came from
the most populous East Asian country’). Potts (2007) and Williamson (2010) say that slurs
make the same truth-conditional contributions as their counterparts, but conventionally im-
plicate something bad. And Schlenker (2007) says the bad thing is a presupposition.
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Because ‘redskin’ is an expression that has historically or paradigmat-
ically been used by people who disparage Native Americans.13
This use of metalinguistic facts to explain the problematic nature of
slurs raises the question of how finely-grained our characterization of
those facts, and thus of the speech acts such expressions can be used to
perform, should be. Although I am not aware of anyone who has de-
fended such a view, it is easy to see that there is theoretical space available
to claim that understanding what speakers do with slurs requires only a
relatively coarse-grained characterization of the relevant metalinguistic
facts, and thus of the relevant speech acts.14 On this sort of position, a
slur would be an expression whose past was bad enough, or whose of-
fensive uses were widespread enough, to taint it with the metadata tag
‘I am a slur’; competence with the expression would require knowing
that it is a slur, but not necessarily knowing its history in any detail.
Dı´az-Legaspe, Liu and Stainton (2019) offer a view that character-
izes various slurring expressions (and non-slurs, as well) with regard
to a variety of different ‘register features’. On their view, a fully com-
petent user of an expression will not just know whether it is a slur or
not, but will understand where on a scale of offensiveness it falls (if it
is a slur), and will understand a variety of facts about its typical pat-
tern of use, such as whether it is a regionalism, or a term only appro-
priately directed at or employed by older or younger speakers, and so
on. (This point applies not just to slurs, but to a wide variety of
expressions that are marked for register.)
Lepore and Stone (2018) and Nunberg (2018) defend still more
particularized views, on which to be a fully competent user of a slur-
ring expression, you must not only know that the word is a slur, or
know how offensive a slur it is compared to others, but furthermore,
know something about the particular historical circumstances from
which the slur’s contemporary use descends. For Lepore and Stone,
the offensiveness of the anti-Semitic slur ‘kike’, for example, is bound
up with historical facts about anti-Semitism. The history of anti-
Semitic prejudice is probably long enough and vile enough to guar-
antee that ‘kike’ would be a slur even if the events of the Holocaust
had never taken place. The fact that the Holocaust did occur, however,
13 Note that this strategy does not involve a problematic regress. As noted by, for example,
Anderson and Lepore (2013), it is possible to insult and disparage someone without using a
word that is marked as insulting or disparaging. If the practice of using a certain word to
disparage catches on, the word may come to be associated with metadata it previously was not.
14 On some ways of unpacking this idea, the resulting view might end up bearing substan-
tial resemblance to the position described by Anderson and Lepore (2013).
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is implicated in making speech acts realized with the expression the
speech acts they are. In Lepore and Stone’s terms, the ‘tone’ of the
expression ‘kike’, as used today, reflects the history of systematic anti-
Semitic violence from the middle of the twentieth century; people who
use the expression activate that history, and people who encounter the
expression recognize as much.
Nunberg, along similar lines, says that ‘by affiliating himself with
the historical owners of [a slur], the speaker doesn’t simply evoke the
word’s background but materially obtrudes it into the context’
(Nunberg 2018, p. 286). He illustrates the point with the following
passage from Langston Hughes’s autobiography:
The word nigger sums up for us who are colored all the bitter years of
insult and struggle in America: the slave-beatings of yesterday, the
lynchings of today, the Jim Crow cars, the only movie show in town with
its sign up FOR WHITES ONLY, the restaurants where you may not eat,
the jobs you may not have, the unions you cannot join. The word nigger in
the mouths of little white boys at school, the word nigger in the mouth of
the foreman at the job, the word nigger across the whole face of America!
(Hughes 1940/2002, pp. 205–6)
If we accept this kind of fine-grained characterization of the metadata
that are associated with slurs, and thus of the particular speech acts they
can be used to realize, it is a short step to the conclusion that there will
be speech acts realizable in a certain language that can only be realized
in that language.15 While no one would deny that it is possible in our
world as it is to disparage Afro-Ecuadorians using expressions with a
problematic history in Ecuadorian Spanish, the particular kind of de-
rogative acts thus realized will turn out to be importantly different from
the kind people speaking American English realize when they use the n-
word. To understand exactly what someone does when they disparage
someone using that word, you have to know something about its par-
ticularly problematic history.16 For the same reason, in order to do what
someone does when they use that word, you have to use that word.
15 It is important to distinguish metadata that speakers can be reasonably assumed to
mutually know, and thus deploy for the purposes of realizing speech acts, from metadata
that are of use only to the lexicographer. So, for example, while every English speaker can
be expected to recognize certain general facts about the relative frequencies of familiar lexical
alternatives, only a very few will know anything about the absolute frequency with which a
word occurs in the English corpus. Facts of the former sort, but not the latter, are relevant in
determining the speech act possibilities associated with a certain expression. Thanks to Robert
Stainton and an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.
16 To be clear, there are different senses in which someone can count as knowing what
someone else is doing with her words. You can recognize that someone is insulting you
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It is important to emphasize that I do not mean any of the forego-
ing to suggest that slurring is a form of speech that deserves protec-
tion, or that the particular inventory of slurs that different languages
make available is a valuable part of the expressive richness of the
human inventory.17 I have put slurs in a prominent place in the dis-
cussion because slurs, in virtue of their unfortunate power, provide a
particularly striking example of a fact I take to be perfectly general: the
history of a particular expression constrains the space of the speech
acts that can be realized by means of that expression.
Once we realize the significance of this point, it becomes clear that
there are basic interpretative tasks that require a more fine-grained
characterization of speech acts than traditional speech act theory pro-
vides. In many cases, to properly appreciate what someone is doing
with her words, we have to attend to more than what Searle (1975)
called the illocutionary force and the propositional content thereby
expressed. We have to attend, furthermore, to the manner in which the
speech act in question is realized.18
Often, facts about the manner in which a speech act is realized—
facts that matter where the question ‘What speech act was this?’ is
concerned—are facts that depend on the idiosyncrasies of a particular
language. We have just looked at an example of one way in which
those idiosyncrasies are manifest: history. In the rest of this section,
I will consider other sources of cross-linguistic variation, and we will
see how the various sources are interwoven to further magnify the
differences between languages. We will see, that is, how people are able
without seeing how exactly the insult works, for example, because you do not know what one
of the words involved means. Although there is no space here to develop and defend the point,
it is plausible to think that linguistic competence comes in degrees, and that language users
with the highest degree of competence will recognize the fine-grained and not just the broad
classes of the speech acts they encounter.
17 This is not to say that there is nothing valuable in the vicinity; it may sometimes be the
case that the harm wrought by slurs plays a significant role in making possible the kind of
solidarity that can be reinforced by way of a reclaimed slur. See Bianchi (2014), Ritchie (2017)
and Jeshion (2018) for discussion. I imagine that few people would be tempted to claim that,
all things considered, the good made possible by reclamation makes it worth having slurs
around.
18 There is a sense in which philosophers working in the tradition descended from Grice
(1975) all pay a lot of attention to the manner in which a speech act is performed. The point
here, however, is that manner is relevant to determining the identity of a speech act in a more
direct and fundamental way than simply by determining the conversational implicatures it
generates. I imagine that this fact will seem obvious to literary theorists, comedians, play-
wrights, and the person in the street, but it seems not to occupy nearly as prominent a place in
the philosophy of language as it should.
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to exploit mutually known facts about the conventional distinctions
the language makes, about phonetic and semantic similarities certain
expressions bear to others in the language, about register and fre-
quency, and so on, to do different things with words. While a trans-
lation of the expressions used to realize a certain speech act might
preserve some of the features that made an act the act it was, there are
many cases in which important properties of a piece of discourse—
properties that help to determine which speech acts it might be used
to realize—do not survive translation. While there may be an expres-
sion available in the language in which the translation is rendered that
matches the original expression in terms of its content, say, or even
content and register, there will not generally be an expression that is a
feature-for-feature analogue where the full range of metadata is con-
cerned. This means that speech acts which leverage those metadata
cannot be realized in translation. The best way to make the signifi-
cance of this point clear is to walk through some examples.
2.2 Different languages conventionalize different things
Differences in the inventories of conventional tools that different lan-
guages make available provide one important source of cross-linguis-
tic variation in terms of possible speech acts.19 Examples from poetry
illustrate this point nicely. Consider, for example, the following dec-
laration made by the lyrical subject of Jose´ Herna´ndez’s Martı´n Fierro,
which relies on a conventional device from Spanish which English
lacks:
(3) Yo soy toro en mi rodeo. Y torazo en rodeo ajeno …
I am bull in my rodeo. And big.bull in rodeo of.another …
‘I am the bull in my own herd, and a braver bull in the next one …’
(Herna´ndez 1872/1967, p. 7).
This line illustrates how an author writing in Spanish is able to exploit
derivational morphology to do something that an English author or
translator cannot. The point of the line is to establish a contrast,
between the properties the lyrical subject is understood to instantiate
at home and those instantiated when away. By using two instances of
the same word root—toro/torazo—to establish the contrast, however,
the author calls as much attention to that which is constant across the
two contexts as to that which changes. On a natural reading, we
understand that the lyrical subject swells into a more substantial
19 For an argument that aims to establish that even such high-level speech acts types as
promising and asserting depend on the evolution of conventional markers, see Stainton (2016).
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version of himself when away; the changes are changes in degree, not
of kind. This interpretation is reinforced in the following stanza by the
lines ‘Con los blandos yo soy blando / Y soy duro con los duros’,
which we might render roughly as ‘I am good-natured with those of a
good nature, and unforgiving with the unforgiving’.
By focusing on a single property—bravery—Catherine Ward’s
English translation obscures this reading. We might attempt to
bring it out by replacing ‘a braver bull’ with ‘more of a bull’, or
something similar. Crucially, however, there is no way of doing so
in English that preserves the effect wrought by the derivational form,
wherein we literally see reduplication and expansion in the words used
to express the idea of growth.20
Another prominent source of conventional variation across lan-
guages concerns forms of politeness. It is common for European lan-
guages, for example, to distinguish between a formal and an informal
second-person form of address. As an anonymous referee notes,
Japanese distinguishes between many more levels of familiarity than
European languages do, and I have written elsewhere about politeness
in Korean, which involves at least seven, and possibly several more,
levels of formality.21
While there is no question that English speakers can distinguish
formal or polite speech from informal, marking the distinctions by
means of lexical choice, syntax and intonation, the fact that certain
languages conventionalize these roles allows for new speech act pos-
sibilities. There is something important that speakers of Japanese and
Korean can do—and speakers of French and Russian, to a lesser
extent—that speakers of most contemporary versions of English
cannot.22 They can employ a conventional device that their language
20 Mike Martin has pointed out that the translator may have elected for ‘braver’ because
the alliteration recreates some of the effect of the derivational morphology of the original. In
my mind, this underscores the point that the translator is forced to make choices about which
approximation is the best approximation; there is no way for her to do in English all of the
various things the Spanish original does, that is, no equivalent construction that has the same
architecture of content, sound, structure, and so on.
21 I ignore differences between politeness and formality here. Interestingly, Korean requires
speakers to choose between conventional forms that track, not just the relation between
speaker and addressee, but also between speaker and topic of conversation. In addition to
politeness, these choices in Korean also reflect a variety of family and gender roles, which
allows for a set of subversive possibilities that languages which do not conventionalize these
roles do not. I discuss these subversions in more detail in Nowak (forthcoming).
22 The Editors note that there are English dialects that preserve a parallel distinction in the
pronoun system, pointing to Yorkshire as an example.
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makes available for the express purpose of situating themselves vis-a`-
vis their interlocutors. Where the level of politeness is concerned, they
can (and indeed must) haul up a flag, as it were, that is available to
every speaker of the language and immediately recognizable by every
speaker of the language.
In several places in his work, Aleksandr Pushkin exploits the gram-
matical requirement that politeness be marked in Russian on a two-
point scale to a poetic—and speech-act-theoretic—end. Consider, for
example, Tatiana’s letter from Eugene Onegin, at chapter 3, verse 32.
For most of the letter, and indeed her previous speech in general,
Tatiana addresses Onegin using the polite second-person form of ad-
dress. At line 34, however, she slips into the familiar form, which she
repeats fifteen times before returning to the formal just once when
closing at line 78. In his commentary on the text, Nabokov (1975b)
indicates that Pushkin was deploying a familiar technique from con-
temporary French epistolary novels (there are textual reasons to think
that Tatiana would know these novels—could her slip have been af-
fected?). In translation, both Nabokov (1975a) and Falen, whose ver-
sion of Onegin (Pushkin 2009) is one of the most widely read in
English, mark the Russian transition from vy to ty by rendering
Tatiana’s first use of ty as ‘thine’:
(Pushkin 1959b, p. 69)
Another! No! In all creation
There’s no one else whom I’d adore
The heavens chose my destination
And made me thine for evermore!
My life till now has been a token
In pledge of meeting you, my friend;
And in your coming, God has spoken
You’ll be my guardian till the end …
(Pushkin 2009, p. 74)
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Few English readers are likely to notice the distinction between ‘thee’
and ‘you’, much less to recognize that it is meant to realize an emo-
tional transition, a headlong rush from formality to intimacy.
Sometimes, English translations of the poem and others that employ
the same technique are accompanied by a note that reminds readers
that archaic English distinguished the formal ‘you’ from the informal
‘thee’.23 When the poem is read in light of such notes, English readers
can vaguely see how the structure is meant to work. But this is like the
sense in which it is possible to appreciate why a joke that you have
failed to understand the first time around would have been funny if
you had understood properly. That is not the sense tellers of jokes are
after when they tell jokes, and it is not the sense a poet or translator
would aim for, given the choice. The gap between the effect the
modern English reader understands is meant to be felt and the
effect that is in fact produced by the alternation between ‘you’ and
‘thee’ simply has no analogue in most varieties of contemporary
English. After one instance of ‘thee’, both Nabokov and Falen give
up and render the remaining instances of ty as ‘you’, and neither
marks Tatiana’s return to vy at the end of her letter.
To show how the structural similarities between Russian and
French—both languages that distinguish between informal and
formal second-person forms of address—allow for a more faithful
reproduction, it is instructive to compare a French version of
Tatiana’s letter which Nabokov offers in the commentary that accom-
panies his English translation. For the first several stanzas of the letter,
Nabokov translates Tatiana’s second-person addresses to Onegin
using vous. At line 34, however, where her Russian vy becomes ty,
the French pronoun inventory makes tu available, which allows the
contrast to be marked:
Un autre! … Non, a` nul autre au monde
je n’aurais donne´ mon cœur!
C’est ainsi qu’en a de´cide´ le conseil d’en-haut,
c’est la volonte´ du ciel: je suis a` toi.
Ma vie entie`re fut le gage
de notre rencontre certaine;
Dieu t’envoie a` moi, je le sais;
Tu seras mon gardien jusqu’a` la tombe …
(Nabokov 1975b, p. 388)
23 See, for example, Pushkin’s 1828 ‘Ty i vy ’, in Pushkin (1959a, p. 207), translated as ‘Thou
and You’ in Pushkin (1999, p. 75). In Nowak (2019), I use that poem to make the same point.
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In summary, languages differ widely in terms of the range of con-
ventional tools they make available. We have looked at examples
involving derivational morphology and scales of politeness, but dif-
ferent languages feature conventional devices that track a tremendous
variety of different properties.24 Since differences in the inventory of
conventional devices amount to differences in the space of possible
modes of action, this means that different languages make a tremen-
dous variety of different speech acts possible.
2.3 Overlapping features are part of our everyday linguistic lives
Examples drawn from poetry provide a particularly clear illustration
of the way in which the space of things we can do with our words
depends on the way our language is set up. The identity of a verse is
constituted not just by its propositional content, if such there be, but
by its syntactic, lexical, morphological and phonological features,
among other things. Poetic language invites reflection by calling at-
tention to itself, demanding that we treat form as content. Crucially,
however, the linguistic self-consciousness and exploitation of multiple
overlapping sources of significance that we typically associate with
poetry is in fact a pervasive feature of our linguistic practice.
To see this, consider a case that bridges the gap between literature
and our everyday spoken lives. Commentators reacting to Russian
president Vladimir Putin’s decision to erect a 17-metre monument
to the medieval Russian Orthodox Saint Vladimir joked on Twitter:
(4) Putin pamyatnik sebe vozdvig nerukotvornyi!
Putin monument to.himself erected untouched.by.hands
‘Putin erected himself a monument untouched by human hands.’
This formulation is designed to echo a declaration made by the
lyrical subject of Pushkin’s ‘Exegi monumentum’:
(5) Ya pamyatnik sebe vozdvig nerukotvornyi!
I monument to.myself erected untouched.by.hands
‘I erected myself a monument untouched by human hands.’
24 An anonymous referee points out that, in addition to the devices we have considered here,
languages differ substantially in terms of the way in which lexical distinctions are drawn. In many
cases, these differences will lead to different speech act possibilities along the lines developed here.
Colour terms, for example, like the Russian sinnyi/goluboi pair, which together represent the space
picked out in English by ‘blue’, have been the subject of substantial discussion. See Gleitman and
Papafragou (2005) for a survey of the issues raised by these and related data. Dı´az-Legaspe, Liu
and Stainton (2019) discuss a number of expressions whose significance is best characterized in
terms of what they call ‘use-theoretic’ meanings, like ‘gezundheit’ and ‘welcome’; languages differ
widely in terms of the kinds of situations that are tracked by conventional devices of this sort.
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Students of the Russian poetic corpus will know that at the end of
‘Exegi monumentum’, the lyrical subject claims the monument he
creates by means of the poem will stand taller than and endure
longer than a famous monument to Aleksandr I. Such readers will
recognize comparisons, then, between Putin and Pushkin, and be-
tween Putin and Aleksandr I, in addition to the comparison with
Horace’s Odes evoked by the title and reinforced throughout the
poem by thematic similarities.25
Even without the benefit of the literary background, however, (4)
wears its satirical status on its sleeve. The atypical syntax and the low-
frequency, high-register words vozdvig and nerukotvornyi convey
a sense of grandiloquent irony. This sense will be lost on no one
who speaks Russian; if you do not know that words like these are
only used in lofty proclamations, you have missed something. Fully
competent speakers, in other words, will recognize that the words
involved in this string are tagged with metadata like [archaic] and
[high-register].
We can try to recreate the effect of the Russian in English by expli-
citly pointing out the connections between Pushkin’s original and the
netizen’s permutation. Again, however, as anyone who has ever
mangled a joke will know, something’s admitting of an explanation
as to why it would be funny is not the same as its being funny. The
author of (4) relies on her target audience’s familiarity with the facts
about syntactic and lexical register in order to send a crucial signal
about what she is doing—satirizing. The action would not be the
action it is if the audience could not be counted on to recognize
those facts.
For another example of the way in which the speech act possibilities
associated with an expression depend on the particular constellation
of content and metadata it encodes, consider a case Lepore and Stone
mention, but do not discuss in detail.26 Andrew O’Hehir, writing for
Salon, offers the following take on the word ‘niggardly ’:
Should we stop using the adjective ‘niggardly,’ because it accidentally
resembles another word?
25 It is worth emphasizing here that the poet very clearly takes the poem to be a speech act;
the monument he fashions is constituted by the words that make up the poem and their
structure, and is explicitly intended to make his greatness evident. See §3 below for further
discussion.
26 Here I repeat my discussion of this case from Nowak (2019, p. 318).
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That one is instructive, in a way. Along with roughly 100 percent of the
media, I thought that controversy was ludicrous when it came up in the
late ’90s and early 2000s: If we consult the dictionary, we learn that
‘niggardly ’ can be traced back to Middle English and Old Norse, and has
no etymological connection to the racial slur. But I have to say that my
perspective has since shifted. We pretty much have dumped that word,
because it is so easily misunderstood and other words will do, and also
because it carries a permanent taint: The only person who would
conceivably use it now would be a snickering, anti-p.c. asshole trying to
make an obnoxious point. (O’Hehir 2015)27
Suppose you are watching a televised debate with a friend who does
not speak English. One of the parties to the debate, a nationalist can-
didate, uses the word ‘niggardly ’ to describe his opponent’s approach
to veteran’s affairs. You snort derisively. Your friend, who is following
the subtitles in her own language, is surprised and asks why. While it
might be right, at a high level of generality, to say that the speaker has
done something offensive, that response would not quite explain your
reaction. Of course, in some contexts, derision might be an appropri-
ate reaction to offensive behaviour—we might expect a certain level of
decency from public figures, and take them to be worthy of scorn
when they fail to live up to the expected standard by saying offensive
things.
In this case, however, there is really more to the story. Speakers with
the highest degree of competence in English will recognize not simply
that the speech act realized was offensive, but that it was offensive in a
highly particular way—in precisely the way a liberal listener would
expect from a ‘snickering, anti-p.c. asshole trying to make an obnox-
ious point’.28 In virtue of what do we recognize this? Your friend,
27 Several members of the Mind editorial team report not sharing O’Hehir’s intuitions
about the pattern of use associated with ‘niggardly ’, and raise the possibility that the word
may be associated with different patterns of use in British and American English. My reaction
as an American patterns with O’Hehir’s, but it is important to flag the possibility of divergence
here.
28 Importantly, I am not saying that the negative evaluation of the speaker on the part of
the interpreter is entailed by the speech act in question. The nationalist candidate’s supporters
will detect in his speech a refreshing openness, a tweaking of the nose of the politically correct
opposition. The important thing to notice here is that part of competence with English is
knowing about the metadata associated with the lexical items and syntactic structures of
English. So regardless of what you think of this act, you recognize the difference between it
and the variation that would have been realized had ‘niggardly ’ been replaced with ‘stingy ’ or
‘miserly ’, or whatever. The liberal listener and the nationalist listener can disagree about
whether the point is obnoxious or not, but they will both recognize that it involves a
transgression.
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surprised at the specificity of a description like this, might point out
that the subtitles offered only ‘My opponent’s treatment of our hon-
oured veterans has been ungenerous’, which seems perfectly neutral.
At some level of description, the translator has got things right. The
speech act in question is an assertion. Its content is precisely the
content reported by the translation. The translation misses out, how-
ever, on a constellation of properties that are tagged in the metadata
associated with ‘niggardly ’, metadata that fully competent speakers are
familiar with, and that fully competent speakers exploit in speaking
and in interpreting one another. O’Hehir does a good job tracking
many of the relevant properties in the passage quoted above; one is
that ‘niggardly ’ is an extremely low-frequency and antiquated expres-
sion, another is that it is phonetically uncomfortably similar to the n-
word. More subtly, but no less importantly, there is the fact that we
have other words in English that we can use to express the truth-
conditional contribution ‘niggardly ’ would express.
Of course, all of this information could be imparted to someone
who did not know English. Sometimes, in fact, subtitles will feature
explanations of jokes or innuendos that depend on phonetic features
of the target language, or register facts, or exploit other kinds of lin-
guistic metadata. Explaining how something is done, however, is a
different thing from doing it. In order to be offensive in exactly the
way the politician who says ‘niggardly ’ is offensive—to be offensive by
deploying a word that looks and sounds like the n-word and is almost
never used because of that fact, but that means what ‘stingy ’ or ‘mis-
erly ’ do—you have to be speaking English.29
The self-conscious exploitation of the particular cluster of semantic,
syntactic and phonetic features associated with a certain string is
common to a wide variety of kinds of linguistic activity. For a final
example, consider the case of commercial communication, as evi-
denced by the following street advertisement created by the London
firm Bartle Bogle Hegarty:
29 Although I have focused my discussion on the metadata associated with an expression,
the key idea is that the identity of the speech act is determined by the precise set of over-
lapping features of various sorts associated with the words used to realize it. One of those
features, of course, is the semantic content the word expresses. If ‘niggardly ’ had meant what
‘regally ’ means, the example might not work the way it does. The positive evaluative valence
would presumably defeat the invocation of the n-word.
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To a speaker of American English, who expects ‘fillet’ to rhyme with
‘ballet’, this copy will be baffling. In England, however, where ‘fillet’
rhymes with ‘billet’, this is the kind of thing you get when you con-
tract a top-tier advertising agency to sell a chicken sandwich formed
from two pieces of meat. While no one will be tempted to call this a
speech act of great cultural significance, it is just as clear that it would
not be the act it is were it not for certain facts about the language used
to realize it, facts which every speaker of the local dialect can be
assumed to know.
2.4 Totting up
If the foregoing considerations are on the right track, there are speech
acts whose identity depends on the particular words and structures
used to realize them. On one prominent treatment of slurring expres-
sions, recognizing the particular kind of derogation realized by means
of a slur requires understanding something about the social history
from which the slur emerged; aspects of that history are encoded in
the metadata associated with the word. In cases drawn from both
literature and colloquial speech, we have seen how recognizing
which speech acts are at issue requires recognizing, not just the
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meanings of the words used, but specific facts about the way in which
those meanings interact with a pattern of other features, like their
sounds, relative frequencies, history of prominent past use, and so on.
Since the particular cluster of features associated with a word in one
language is specific to that language, speech acts that exploit the rela-
tionship between multiple features will depend for their identity on
the language in which they are realized. There are things you can do in
Spanish, in other words, that you cannot do in English. The lyrical
subject of Martı´n Fierro compares himself to a bull. I can also com-
pare myself to a bull. I can even compare myself to a bull in an
alliterative way that evokes some of the repetition of the Spanish ori-
ginal. But I cannot compare myself to a bull in exactly the way that the
lyrical subject of the poem does, because his comparison involves a
feature of Spanish that English lacks. Similarly, you can sell chicken
sandwiches in other languages. You can even sell them using puns. But
you cannot sell them using a pun that rhymes ‘fillet’ with ‘fill it’,
unless those words mean what they do in your other language, and
also have the same sounds.
To be clear, this is not to suggest that there is any high-level type of
speech act, like refusing or permission-granting, that is specific to a
certain language. The claim instead is that in addition to the utility of
thinking of speech acts as belonging to one or another type at this high
level of generality, there are also reasons to individuate them more
finely, for example, reasons to think that comparing oneself to a bull
by exploiting a certain feature of Spanish derivational morphology is a
subtype of the more general speech act of comparing oneself to a bull,
which is itself a subtype of a range of more general classes of speech
acts still (such as comparing and asserting).
Before moving on to look at what this claim about language-specific
speech acts has to do with the phenomenon of language loss, I want to
address an objection. An anonymous referee wonders whether the
considerations advanced here really support the idea that languages
make particular speech act subtypes available,30 as opposed to making
certain perlocutionary effects possible at all, or to making them more
or less easily possible.
30 By ‘speech act subtypes’ I have in mind speech acts individuated with the fineness of
grain I have insisted on here. So, if refusing is a type of speech act, I claim that we can usefully
distinguish types of that act that will be distinguished by fully competent speakers of the
language in which the refusal is realized, for example, refusing by using such-and-such a
word, with such-and-such a salient history.
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I think the referee is right that there may be perlocutionary effects
that are only realizable in a particular language, or more easily realized
in one language than in another. In the case of a poem, for example, it
seems plausible to think that there is a type of aesthetic experience the
poem produces which is fairly stable across readers, but which is
nevertheless distinguishable from their evaluations of it, or from
other more particular subjective experiences that it is implicated in
generating. A certain combination of words might have a certain son-
orous quality that we all recognize, for example, even if we differ about
whether it is pleasant, and even if it evokes different memories for us.
By the same token, the kinds of rhetorical strategies that will be psy-
chologically effective in getting a certain content across might vary
across languages in interesting ways.
The idea that the expressive possibilities offered by a certain lan-
guage might influence the perlocutionary effects that can be (more or
less easily) realized in that language is surely an important one, and
may itself provide reasons for valuing the diversity of languages.31 But
that point involves a different phenomenon from the one I am focused
on here. Regardless of whether people have broadly similar aesthetic
responses to a poem or not, there is an indisputable stability to at least
a certain subset of their intellectual reactions, that is, to the reactions
that they have simply in virtue of being speakers of English. You can
like what a poet is doing in a poem or not like what she is doing, or be
moved or unmoved, or be reminded of a certain moment in your life
or not, but there is one thing you cannot avoid if you are a fully
competent speaker of English: you cannot avoid recognizing that the
poet is doing something that involves a certain precise constellation of
facts about meaning, sound, shape, and so on. By the same token,
whether you think the speaker deserves censure or praise, whether you
find the statement sophomoric or refreshing, if you are a fluent
speaker of idiomatic English, you cannot help but see that someone
who uses ‘niggardly ’ instead of ‘stingy ’ or ‘miserly ’ thereby does
something different.
This kind of recognition, however, is one of the hallmarks of an
illocutionary act—see Grice (1957), who, to put things crudely, held
that what it is to assert that P is to utter a sentence with the intention
of getting someone to recognize your intention that the utterance
31 Indeed, research on the different perlocutionary possibilities that are available to native
and non-native speakers of a language provide an important reason for caring about the extent
to which people are given the opportunity to present themselves in their native language; see
Van Parijs (2000) and Ayala (2015) for related discussion.
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represent that P. Although I do not mean to claim that each of the
choices that goes into the construction of the poem expresses a deter-
minate propositional content in the way an assertion does, it would be
hard to deny that many of those choices involve the same structure of
intention and recognition that is typical of speech acts. To put the
point another way: the kind of ‘perlocutionary effect’ I take to be
produced by the examples I am interested in is an intellectual one,
the recognition of a certain kind of intention on the part of the
speaker. To call this sort of intellectual achievement a mere perlocu-
tionary effect, however, is simply to collapse the distinction between
perlocutionary effects and the kind of uptake that makes an illocut-
ionary act an illocutionary act.
3. Silencing, loss, and harm
Langton (1993) and Hornsby (1995), drawing on MacKinnon (1987,
1993), famously argue that certain especially troubling forms of porn-
ography can bring about the illocutionary silencing of women, by
making certain classes of speech act impossible to perform. On their
view, this silencing is a result of the fact that such pornography under-
mines what Austin (1962) called the ‘uptake condition’ on speech acts,
according to which a certain kind of audience reaction is a necessary
condition on an act’s counting as a speech act of the intended type, or
even counting as a speech act at all.32 A man who is used to seeing
depictions of certain kinds of sexualized violence might hear a woman
utter the word ‘no’, but fail to recognize that her utterance was in-
tended as a refusal. In such a case, the utterance would in fact fail to be
32 Exactly what kind of reaction is required from an audience, or whether a reaction should
really be required at all, is a contentious question. We have already considered one case here—
the case of slurring—which suggests that an audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention
to realize a certain speech act cannot be a necessary condition on the act’s being the act it is.
(In fact, the case of slurring suggests that the speaker’s intention will sometimes be immaterial
as well.) Bird (2002) offers a range of cases that make the same point. A particularly illustrative
example from his discussion is the case of lying; surely, he argues, it cannot be a requirement
on some utterance’s counting as a lie that hearers recognize it as a lie. While this must be
right, I take it that Bird’s interlocutors could agree, but deflect the force of the criticism by
claiming that what the observation shows is simply that the uptake conditions on some speech
acts are more complicated that the audience’s realizing which act was intended by the speaker.
In any case, the argument I will offer here depends only on a very weak form of the uptake
condition, a form that I think has substantial prima facie plausibility. I require only that
speech acts of the sort I am interested in at least involve the possibility of uptake. See also
Gru¨nberg (2011) and Kukla (2014) for further discussion.
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a refusal, and the woman would be deprived of an important ability—
the ability to refuse sex.
We can construct a variation on Langton and Hornsby ’s form of
argument to show that language loss involves a kind of illocutionary
silencing. The argument is simple: as a language disappears, speech
acts the last speakers might otherwise have realized in that language, as
well as any candidate speech acts that survive in recorded form, are
progressively undermined by the impossibility of uptake. When a lan-
guage is gone, speech acts realizable only in that language are lost
completely.
This means that speakers of threatened languages face a form of
illocutionary silencing; some of the illocutionary acts that they would
previously have been able to realize are undermined. If Spanish should
disappear, no one would be able to recognize the self-conscious way in
which Herna´ndez exploits the toro/torazo alternation to make the ex-
pansion of the lyrical subject manifest on the page (or in speech). If
English were to disappear, no one would be able to sell a chicken
sandwich by rhyming ‘fillet’ with ‘fill it’.
In a sense, then, we have already provided an answer to the question
with which we began: what is lost when a language vanishes? The
answer is: the class of speech acts whose realization depends on that
language. There is, however, another sense in which this answer clearly
falls short of what a reasonable expectation about the scope of the
project would have been at the beginning. Saying that some speech
acts are undermined by some set of circumstances is not, in and of
itself, to say why anyone should care. To answer the question about
language loss in a satisfying way, we must say something about why
the kind of silencing involved is morally significant.
In the substantial literature that has been developed on the topic of
illocutionary silencing, it has been widely recognized that some cases
of silencing are morally significant while others are not. No one, for
example, will be troubled by the fact that a child cannot place some-
one under arrest by saying ‘You are under arrest’, or by the fact that a
parrot cannot void a contract by saying ‘I hereby pronounce this
contract void’.
So what makes some instances of silencing morally problematic and
others not? Many discussions of the phenomenon are built around
cases in which the speaker has a particularly fundamental interest in
realizing the speech act or kind of speech act that is undermined. For
example, in a passage that has become a touchstone in the literature
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on the subject, Jacobson comments on the possibility that a woman’s
attempts to refuse sex go unrecognized as such:
What is so terrible about a woman’s being unable to refuse sex is the
disablement of her autonomy, the resulting violation of her body, and the
assault on her well-being. (Jacobson 1995, p. 76)
Even where the stakes are lower, however, there is still room for
silencing to count as problematic. For example, Maitra (2009) and
Kukla (2014) have pointed out that the cases that are at issue in the
silencing literature typically raise another sort of problem as well: they
involve speakers whose illocutionary possibilities are comparatively
limited with regard to those of other speakers in virtue of their iden-
tities as members of disadvantaged social groups.33 While opinions
vary about which kinds of group membership are relevant in this
connection, and how exactly the notion of a comparative reduction
in speech act force should be characterized, two cases from Maitra
make the outlines of the approach clear:
Scenario 2: At a dinner party, the hostess presses a guest to help himself to
more food. The guest is already full, and does not want any more. So he
refuses the further helping. His hostess understands the conventional
meaning of his utterance. But she also supposes that he is simply being
polite, not wanting to appear too greedy. She supposes that good guests
always say something similar when offered more food. As a result, she
disregards his protests, and continues to press food on him, until he finally
feels that he must give in.
Scenario 3: In a philosophy class, an African-American student offers a
counter-example to a proposal the class is considering. The teacher
understands the conventional meaning of his utterance. But given her
beliefs about African-American students in general, she has low expect-
ations of this student. In particular, she thinks that African-American
students tend not to understand how philosophical arguments work.
Accordingly, she fails to recognize his intention to offer a counter-example,
and instead, re-explains the proposal to him. Later in the class, a white
student re-states the same counter-example, and the teacher recognizes
that it devastates the proposal. (Maitra 2009, pp. 15–16)
Maitra points out that the guest who is illocutionarily disem-
powered in virtue of his being a guest is disabled in virtue of a
33 Although not explicitly concerned with the question of justice or injustice, Richmond
(1996) offers another illuminating discussion of speech acts and the ways in which a speaker’s
illocutionary possibilities might depend on facts about her social position; significant portions
of that discussion involve acts similar to those I have relied on to make my case here, acts
whose nature depends on allusions, associations, and similar.
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property he instantiates only in passing—the disempowerment ends
with dinner. The student who is disempowered in virtue of being
African-American, on the other hand, is disempowered in virtue of
instantiating a stable social property, which means that the silencing is
a pervasive feature of his experience as a speaker. Maitra observes,
moreover, that a person has a degree of control over whether or not
she becomes a guest that she does not have over whether or not she is
racialized in a certain way. And many commentators have noted that
the mechanisms that presumably underlie the illocutionary disem-
powerment of guests—considerations of politeness, and so on—do
not raise questions of justice of the sort raised by the mechanisms
that bring about the silencing of African-Americans.
My aim in the remainder of the paper will be to argue that illocut-
ionary silencing of the sort suffered by the speakers of disappearing
languages should qualify as morally objectionable along both of these
axes. I will claim that the harm suffered by someone deprived of the
ability to realize speech acts in her native language is particularly
acute, since the fullest realization of a person’s self-expression depends
on her ability to select the speech acts she realizes with the fineness of
grain that only a native speaker, speaking with other native speakers,
can. In a fundamental sense, the decisions we make about how to
speak constitute our social identities—so, to be deprived of the fine-
ness of grain that one’s native language allows one when selecting
speech acts is to be deprived of something of tremendous importance.
Furthermore, the kind of silencing that is involved in language loss
affects people pervasively, in virtue of their belonging to a group
(speaker of such-and-such a language) that they did not choose to
belong to, and that is silenced for no obviously just reason.
To see the sense in which speakers of endangered languages suffer
substantial harms, it will be helpful to consider similarities and dif-
ferences with the case of a woman whose ability to refuse sex is under-
mined by pornography. In that case, a person’s ability to realize a
certain class of speech act is broadly undermined. Such illocutionary
disablement counts as extremely significant, since people have a fun-
damental interest in being able to realize speech acts that concern basic
questions about their bodily autonomy.
In the case of a person who speaks a language no one else speaks,
things are different in important ways. If the last speaker of the dis-
appearing language speaks another language as well, she will retain the
ability to perform the same general types of speech acts—making as-
sertions, granting permission, undertaking promises, and so on—that
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everyone else can perform. What she loses is the ability to perform the
full range of possible subtypes of these actions that she would have
been able to perform prior to the loss of the language in question.
Specifically, she loses the ability to perform the speech act subtypes
that can only be performed in the lost language.
That loss, however, should nevertheless count as a substantial one.
When two native speakers are part of a conversation, they recognize
not just the broad moves that their interlocutors make (granting per-
mission, undertaking a promise, and so on), they recognize that these
high-level action types are performed in such-and-such a particular
way. That is, interpreters recognize that, by using a certain word or
expression that activates a certain set of associations with others, that
encodes certain historical facts, and that sounds a certain way, speak-
ers position themselves extremely precisely with regard to a huge range
of possible speech act alternatives.
While the kind of silencing involved in language loss is not straight-
forwardly analogous to silencing as it has most prominently figured in
the literature, there is an important similarity: both involve a loss of
autonomy. If you accept that being able to express yourself in as subtle
and fine-grained a way as language permits is a fundamental human
interest, you should appreciate the pull of this argument, even without
taking a position on the relative significance of that interest and your
interest in bodily autonomy.
The sense in which a candidate speaker’s expressive autonomy is a
thing of fundamental value is perhaps easiest to see in the case of
people whom we know to be deeply concerned with the mode of
the expressions they produce. Consider Pushkin again. Even if we
set aside the question of the aesthetic significance of his work, if we
imagine that Pushkin were among the last speakers of Russian, we can
see how significant a harm he would suffer in virtue of being cut off
from the linguistic community on which his expressive abilities
depend. In the poem we considered above, the lyrical subject states
explicitly that the monument he creates by means of ‘Exegi monu-
mentum’ will endure for as long as the Russian language does, and
that his voice will echo wherever the language is spoken, ‘by the proud
progeny of the Slav, by the Finn, by the still-unbroken residents of the
Tungus, and by the Kalmykian of the steppe’. In other words, if
Russian should be lost, the speech act the poem realizes will be under-
mined, as its uptake conditions are left unsatisfiable, and the author’s
intention that it endure will be frustrated.
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Of course, no speaker can reasonably expect that her speech acts will
persist forever, and no speaker can reasonably expect to be understood
by everyone everywhere. At the same time, however, it seems clear that
speakers have a fundamental interest in being a part of a community
in which they are able to grasp the full significance of the things people
say to them, and to grasp the full significance of the things they say to
others. Each of us has an interest, that is, in being able to express our
thoughts, and in having others be able to grasp those thoughts, in their
full subtlety and glory.34
Our sense of who a person is—and other people’s sense of who we
are—depends in large part on the words we choose to express our-
selves, and on the way in which we deliver those words. We exploit
subtle facts about the relationship between the meaning of a word,
patterns in its use, salient previous history, and similar, to send signals
about the groups we take ourselves to belong to, the groups we aspire
to belong to, the groups we would prefer not to be associated with,
and so on. If someone wants to know how your date went, or your
interview, they will ask, not just about the content of the messages
transmitted, but about their form—‘Tell me exactly what they said!’
The same is true of many other linguistic interactions of various levels
of importance, from speech at social events to political speech and
speech that comes under scrutiny in a court of law.
To the extent that we care about the form of words we use to
express ourselves, and thus about the degree of resolution with
which we exert control over the public identity we assume, we
should care that there be others around who recognize the choices
we make in selecting those words; your jokes would not be the jokes
they are (similarly in the case of your poignant eulogies or stirring
rhetoric) were it not for the fact that there are people around who can
34 Thanks to Eliot Michaelson for the ‘glory ’ of this formulation. Anyone who speaks a
foreign language will understand the discomfort of feeling not quite herself, of not quite being
able to navigate as precisely as she would like. One way to put the present point, then, is to say
that we all have an interest in being such that there is at least some community where we are
not susceptible to this feeling—or at least no more susceptible than anyone else would be.
Importantly, this is not to say that migrants everywhere should move home, or that there are
not advantages to speaking a foreign language. The discomfort of feeling clumsy in a foreign
language is at least sometimes counterbalanced by the exhilaration of feeling that you have
managed to put the point exactly the way you wanted, even though the language is not your
own. And we may very often have good reasons for choosing to live in a community in which
we do not count as native speakers, and thus, as fully empowered linguistic actors. None of
this changes the fact, however, that we still have a basic interest in the existence of such a
community. We have an interest in having the choice, as it were, to be able to speak with a
native voice.
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understand them. The same point, of course, applies to current speak-
ers of threatened languages. If such speakers ever care, for example,
about the particular words or structures that form a story, then their
ability to tell that story the way they want to is undercut by the loss of
the language. Even if the story is not a precious cultural artefact, any
would-be storyteller who finds her expressive repertoire restricted is
harmed; we can imagine her saying ‘It just isn’t quite the same in
English’ (or Spanish, or Bahasa Indonesia, or whatever).
Turning our attention now to the second sense in which cases of
silencing have been taken to be problematic, consider some of the
parallels between the kind of silencing that is at stake in the case of
language loss and the kind of silencing to which Maitra’s African-
American student is subjected. If a speaker should lose the ability to
realize speech acts that depend on the particular features of her heri-
tage language, that loss would obviously be permanent and systematic.
She not only loses the ability to perform a specific class of speech act,
or to perform a specific class of speech act in a certain restricted set of
contexts, she loses the ability to perform any act that depends on her
heritage language, in any context. If a person is permanently and
systematically silenced in virtue of belonging to a certain group, that
is, in virtue of being a native member of a certain linguistic commu-
nity, she is silenced in virtue of a property over which she has no
control. Although the possibility of migration offers us at least some
freedom to choose whether we live in a society in which our native
language or another language is the predominant one, we have no
control over which language we were raised in. Silencing that a
person suffers in virtue of belonging to a particular heritage linguistic
community is unlikely to be morally defensible in the way that, say,
preventing a child from undertaking contractual commitments would
be. And the background social conditions that are implicated in lan-
guage loss are unlikely to have obtained by just means.35
Before closing, I want to consider an objection that takes the form
of an overgeneration worry: if language extinction involves problem-
atic silencing in the way we have claimed here, should we not say the
35 As noted at the outset, language loss generally affects communities of relatively low social
power and prestige; we can recognize this without being forced to claim that the harm
involved in silencing just is the harm of being generally less socially powerful than someone
else—the harm the African-American student suffers by illocutionary disablement is distinct
from any harm suffered by the unjust social order that contributed to producing the disable-
ment. Similarly, the harm suffered by silenced speakers of a disappearing language is distinct
from whatever other political and economic injustices they are likely to have suffered.
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same about language change over time, or even about dialectical dif-
ferences at a single time?
Suppose it is true that certain speech acts depend on the highly
specific constellation of metadata associated with the expressions
and syntactic structures used to realize them, and on speakers’ and
listeners’ mutual knowledge of such. In that case, it seems obvious that
language change will bring with it a reshaping of the realm of possi-
bilities; acts that could have been realized using a certain form of
words might no longer be realizable, and speakers who have failed
to keep up with the times might find their intended speech acts
misfiring.
Indeed, once we begin to track speech acts at the level of resolution I
have argued for here, it becomes difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the question of which possibilities are available to speakers in a given
moment will depend on their specific backgrounds and the back-
grounds of their audiences. Within London alone, to say nothing of
the wider UK, much less the Anglophone world generally, dialects vary
so much that there can hardly be any guarantee that the significance of
all of a speaker’s lexical or syntactic choices, or her choices about
inflection or whatever else, will be recognized in the way the speaker
herself might expect or wish them to be.
The right response to these facts is to acknowledge that linguistic
variation, whether over time or over geographic or sociocultural space,
will sometimes foreclose speech act possibilities, while denying that
the corresponding reductions in speakers’ illocutionary repertoires are
problematic in the way that the silencing engendered by language
extinction is. While there is no space here to consider all of the
issues raised by linguistic variation, it will be worth taking a
moment to distinguish the cases, in order to resist a possible reductio
of the position developed so far in the paper.
Although I would hesitate to commit myself to any very precise
claims about the measures involved, it seems clear that we can talk
sensibly, even if only roughly, about the proportion of a speaker’s
expressive inventory that counts as ‘live’ in a given context, and
thus about the speaker’s degree of freedom to manoeuvre through
the speech act space afforded by her language. Along similar lines,
we can reasonably ask whether a certain speaker ever has access to a
population of speakers with whom she can engage ‘in full colour’, as it
were, and we can ask how often a speaker has such access and how
difficult it is.
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Along both of these axes, the situation of someone like Amadeo
Garcı´a Garcı´a, the last surviving speaker of Taushiro, is fundamentally
different from the situation of a speaker most comfortable in
Multicultural London English who ends up stuck next to a Rees-
Mogg at an event, or someone who tells dad jokes without meaning
to because he has lost track of the current argot.36
First of all, while some of the subtleties of the MLE speaker’s idiom
may be lost on certain interpreters, it is a happy fact about the world
that we do not have to spend all of our time in conversation with
Rees-Moggs. As long as we have access to some community of people
we can engage with who are capable of recognizing the linguistic
moves we make for what they are, we are in a substantially better
position than someone like Garcı´a, for whom such engagement is
simply impossible.
Second, even where dialectical gaps due to time, space, social dif-
ferences, and so on, loom largest, it seems plausible to assume that the
shared space of possibilities that each party to a conversation will
recognize is wider than the space of possibilities that they will not.
So even if I cannot express myself with the fullest fidelity when talking
to someone whose background is substantially different from my own,
if we both speak English, I take it that I can nevertheless manoeuvre
much more adeptly (and be recognized as so doing) than I can in even
a foreign language that I know well.
Finally, where dialectical differences are concerned, the gaps in
speakers’ understandings of one another can be remedied relatively
straightforwardly. Simply by encountering and attending to the be-
haviour of speakers of a different dialect, whether in person or
through media visibility, we can expand the range of speech act signals
we track, and thus expand the range of distinctions we are capable of
recognizing.
4. Conclusion
None of the foregoing is meant to show that a restriction in a speaker’s
expressive repertoire is the worst thing that can happen to her, or that
there are not other bad consequences associated with language loss.
The argument does not aim to establish that we should preserve lan-
guages at all cost, or that the people who are silenced in the way
36 Garcı´a’s case was described in the New York Times by Nicholas Casey (2017). For a
survey introduction to Multicultural London English, see Cheshire, Hall and Adger (2017).
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described should commit themselves to preserving their heritage lan-
guages.37 Indeed, the argument does not even exhaust the range of
plausible harms that might be occasioned by the kind of illocutionary
silencing that we have focused on here.38 Nevertheless, I think that
there is something importantly right about the answer described here
to the question of what is at stake where languages are endangered.
Although substantial further work will admittedly be required to
fully flesh out and defend the position sketched here, I hope that what
has been done so far will suggest that it will be fruitful to consider the
question of language loss from the perspective of a certain sort of fine-
grained approach to speech acts. The examples upon which my dis-
cussion is based reveal that in many cases, our expressive capabilities
depend on particular features of the languages we speak—the things I
can do, as it were, are shaped by the tools that the history of the
language has placed at my disposal. If that is right, then when a lan-
guage disappears, so does a range of possible actions. If we accept that
people have a fundamental interest in being part of a community in
which the same basic stock of tools is available to everyone, and thus
of being part of a community in which each has the ability fully to
realize herself linguistically, we have a reason to lament the loss of a
language.39
37 Importantly, while some speakers of threatened or vanishing languages lament that state
of affairs, it is hardly the case that all do.
38 As Ve´ronique Munoz-Darde´ has pointed out to me, and as the Editors have noted as
well, even if the arguments made here are successful, they appear to miss an intuitive sense in
which the problems raised by language loss go beyond the harms that accrue to individual
speakers. If we focused our attention only on those harms, it might seem as though the best
thing to do in the face of the kind of considerations advanced here would be not to aim to
preserve languages or celebrate linguistic diversity, but to prevent silencing by helping com-
munities transition more quickly to dominant languages. In future work, I hope to be able to
say more about the sense in which we all lose something when we find ourselves in a world of
comparatively fewer expressive possibilities.
39 I would like to thank Simona Aimar, Alex Barber, Nicholas Gooding, Rebecca Harrison,
Mike Martin, Eliot Michaelson, Ve´ronique Munoz-Darde´, Robert Stainton, and Kevin Toh for
helpful comments and discussion. The Editors have provided particularly detailed feedback on
the manuscript, for which I am very grateful, and two anonymous referees have also gone far
beyond the usual standard in their comments. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the par-
ticularly fundamental influence of Lyubov Golburt and Anna Muza, without whose patience
and encouragement this work would not have been possible, and Ekaterina Ignatova, who
helped me to take my first steps in this terrain. Parts of this project were supported by a US
Department of Education Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship and a US Department
of State Fulbright Student Research Fellowship.
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